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(theory of mind and related topics). Between them, these and the other chapters in this
book serve to open up exciting new dimensions in the study of human evolution.
R D
School of Biological Sciences,
University of Liverpool
The Temptations of Evolutionary Ethics. By Paul Lawrence Farber. Pp. 210. (University
of California Press, Berkeley, 1998.) £12.95 paperback, ISBN 0-520-21369-6.
This comprehensive volume appears at a time when many bemoan the decline of ethical
and moral standards. Paul Lawrence Farber, the Distinguished Professor of the
History of Science at Oregon State University, points out in his book that the roots of
this crisis of values reach back to the mid-nineteenth century, the time when science
undermined the religious view of the world amongst the learned public, while being
unable to substitute a code of conduct as strong and coherent as that based on
metaphysics.
The book opens with the review of the contributions to ethics made by Charles
Darwin. These consisted of showing plausibly the evolutionary origin of human moral
sentiment and of establishing its adaptive value. Darwin’s argument was simple:
humans evolved like other animals through natural selection. This included mental
evolution that produced higher faculties including moral sensibilities. Morally correct
actions were those contributing to the ‘general good’ of the community. An approach
to ethics from the perspective of natural history had an intellectual appeal to rational
minds. Among these were two Cambridge graduates: William Kingdon Clifford and
Leslie Stephen. Clifford argued that social efficiency was a measure of right and wrong.
Stephen was influenced by the utilitarian philosophy of John Stuart Mill, although he
did not agree with all its tenets. He was searching for a rational justification of existing
morality rather than trying to establish a new system. Stephen related individual
behaviour to social context and thus considered morality a result of group selection.
A significant place in the book is given to the work of Herbert Spencer, perhaps
the best known of ‘evolutionary ethicists’. Spencer produced the vision of progressive
social evolution leading to the Utopian industrial society based on mutual aid rather
than on competition. Unlike Darwin, who simply sought explanations for the origin of
moral sentiment, Spencer was trying to establish evolutionary justification for social
idealism and in this way to construct ‘strictly scientific morality’.
The search for evolutionary ethics in the second half of the 19th century was
criticized by philosophers and even by evolutionary scientists. Prominent among them
were Thomas Henry Huxley and Alfred Russel Wallace. Huxley maintained that
humans, although a product of evolutionary forces, were reaching beyond the constant
struggle and change in nature to produce stability and permanence. This could be
presented as a conflict between humans and nature, between primitive instincts and
cultural ideas. Wallace, like Huxley, saw the duality of humans and nature. He even
stated that with human mental advance natural selection ceased to operate on the
human body. Wallace’s firm belief in spiritualism contributed to his opinion that
natural selection cannot account for human moral and mental faculties. The views of
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the two evolutionists reflected the general opinion of contemporary philosophers: that
ethics and morality are higher human phenomena that cannot be produced by natural
evolution.
The lines of thought that emerged in the 19th century continued to be pursued with
some modifications throughout the 20th century. Julian Huxley, the grandson of
Thomas Henry, provides the best example. This architect of modern evolutionary
synthesis, like his grandfather, saw a discontinuity between animal evolution and
human conduct, the departure of culture beyond simple biological development. Other
architects of the modern synthesis – George Gaylord Simpson and Theodosius
Dobzhansky – similarly maintained that there was no possibility of deriving ethical
standards from evolutionary history.
Edward O. Wilson’s 1975 book Sociobiology opened the last chapter in the
reappraisal of evolutionary ethics. It stressed the genetic basis of social behaviour. Yet
again, however, the nature/humanity dualism raised its head. Although most
sociobiologists state that there is an evolutionary continuity between animals and
humans, they also believe that culture is largely a specifically human property. Even
Richard Dawkins admits that genes and ‘memes’ (cultural units) may act in opposition
to each other.
At the threshold of the 21st century there is still no answer as to what we can base
our ethical and moral codes on. Science, so triumphant in many other areas, has failed
to provide firm answers to the central question of how we should conduct ourselves
with respect to each other and to the world. This failure leads to environmental
destruction, to continuing military conflicts and to increasing crime rates. It seems that
the reason for this dismal state of affairs is the current focus of scientific activities on
intellectually easy, and financially profitable, achievements in medicine and technology
and neglect of the intellectually demanding issue of the understanding of ourselves.
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Integrated Management of Childhood Illness: A WHO/UNICEF Initiative. Supplement
No. 1 to Volume 75 of the Bulletin of the World Health Organization. Pp. 128. (World
Health Organization, Geneva, 1997.) US $18, ISBN 92-4-068750-5.
Infant and child mortality in low-income countries remains terribly high, with an
estimated 12·4 million deaths occurring among children less than 5 years old each year.
The majority of these deaths are due to acute respiratory infections, diarrhoeal
diseases, measles, malaria and malnutrition and, until recently, it was widely held by
international agencies such as WHO and UNICEF that the single most effective way
to prevent these deaths was through the deployment of disease-specific control
programmes (such as the administration of vitamin A capsules, immunization
programmes etc).
This supplement represents a major shift in the outlook of staff employed by these
international agencies. It acknowledges the limits of many selective biomedical
interventions and suggests that deaths among infants and children could be further
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